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The Economics of Coercion and
Conflict: an Introduction
coercion, n. “1. a. Constraint, restraint, compulsion; the application offorce to control the action of a voluntary agent … b. Forcible restraintof (action) … 2. Government by force, as opposed to that which restsupon the will of the community governed.”
conflict, n. “1. a. An encounter with arms; a fight, battle … b. esp. Aprolonged struggle … c. (without article or pl.) Fighting, contendingwith arms, martial strife.”1The study of economics begins with trade. In an idealized market, sellerscompete with each other for buyers. Under the rules of the market,competition is impersonal and non-violent. Each person makes their bestchoice, which can include staying out of the market; no one is forced totake part. As Adam Smith (1776/2005, p. 364) suggested, a result of thesellers’ pursuit of their own private profit is that resources are “led by aninvisible hand” towards their best uses. In turn, the buyers’ pursuit oftheir own greatest satisfaction ensures that everyone gains who takespart willingly. In the outcome, the well-being of society is raised.This model was first developed when England was still an agrariansociety and is simplified in the extreme, yet it explains much of modernprosperity.The world of coercion and conflict is, at first sight, utterly different. Inthis world “every man is enemy to every man … and the life of man,solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes 1651/1909, pp. 96-97).Each person’s behaviour is limited not by rules but only by their ownconscience or, in its absence, by greed and fear. The immediate casualtiesare other people. In the longer term wealth is destroyed and society isimpoverished. Even if a few lords or warlords retain a profit, there isnever enough left over to compensate the losers.Thus there are two worlds, one of free markets, industriousness, andenjoyment. The other is the world of tyrants, soldiers, slaves, and the lash.The gap between them is apparently unbridgeable. It turns out, however,that among the tools we have developed to analyze markets and
1 OED Online. June 2013. Oxford University Press. http://0-www.oed.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/Entry/35725 andhttp://0-www.oed.com.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/view/Entry/38898(accessed 27 August 2013).
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corporations are some that can readily be turned to understand war andrepression.I am not the first to try to list these concepts and tools and explaintheir application. Economists, historians, and political scientists haverecently contributed excellent applied and theoretical studies of thepolitical economy of dictatorship and coercion (Wintrobe 2000; Gregory2001; Lazarev and Gregory 2003; Dixit 2004; Gregory 2004, 2009).Others have done the same for interstate conflict (Offer 1989, pp. 7-20;Fearon 1995; Bueno de Mesquita 2006, Brauer and van Tuyll 2008, pp. 1-44, Smith 2009, pp. 19-53; Rockoff 2012, pp. 13-47; Garfinkel andSkaperdas 2012; Findlay and O’Rourke 2012).If there is novelty in this chapter, it stems from examining coercionand conflict in the same framework. This is appropriate because the twoare organically connected.
Adversaries, coercion, and conflictTo understand how coercion and conflict are connected, we need somedefinitions. What is conflict? There is a potential for conflict whenevertwo persons disagree, for example, about how to use or dispose of aresource. Resources can be of any kind – physical, financial, political, oremotional. Many such disagreements do not amount to conflict; they arefleeting, and are resolved quickly through compromise, so that they donot end in “an encounter with arms” as the Oxford English Dictionary putsit (cited above). Such readiness to compromise requires mutualrecognition of the entitlements of the parties in disagreement, includingthe right not to agree. The fact that a particular dispute persists over aconsiderable period of time, however, is usually a signal that it is not ofthis transient and harmless nature; the parties cannot agree to eachother’s right to disagree. They become adversaries in a “prolongedstruggle” – one of the alternative meanings that the OED gives to conflict.If unresolved disagreement over entitlements lies at the root ofconflict, how is conflict resolved? Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) defineconflict by the presence of “adversarial investments,” required for the“threat or use of coercive means.” In the words of the OED conflict isinherently violent: adversaries engage in “fighting, contending with arms,martial strife.” Here economists go further: violence is a possible correlateof conflict, but it is not necessary, because expectations matter: the threatof violence can be sufficient, provided it is backed by costly investmentsin “coercive means” (i.e. it is more than just cheap talk). In the presence ofthreats, conflict among adversaries can be worked out under duress butwithout violence, through negotiation or bargaining.
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What is coercion? When I coerce you, I impose my choice on yours. Asthe OED puts it, it is “the application of force to control the action of avoluntary agent.” But the agent is still voluntary, and coercion does notdeprive the agent of all choice. Rather, coercion means I force you tochoose between the alternatives as I have defined them, not as you wouldsee them. Moreover, each of the alternatives I allow you is inferior to theentitlement you have or seek. A highwayman points a gun at you anddemands: “Your money or your life!” That is coercion. Within it, you havea choice: you’re free to choose whether to give me your wallet or die atmy hand. The signal of coercion is that you cannot walk away and keepwhat you had. Whatever you choose, you will end up worse off than youwere before. Thus, when I coerce you, it is intrinsic to the situation thatyou lose something to which you believe you were previously entitled.(And, because entitlements rest ultimately on beliefs, conflicts overentitlement are always perceived asymmetrically. I stand up for myrights; you’re unreasonable.)To summarize, coercion can be distinguished from free exchange, butthe difference does not lie where many would naturally assume, in thevictim’s absence of choice. The difference is that, when you and I tradefreely, you do not suffer any loss of entitlement. Either the choicesavailable to you through trade leave us both better off, or you can remainno worse off by choosing not to trade. Coercion differs from trade not inremoval of the victim’s choice, but in the restriction of choice to a set ofoptions that is strictly inferior to those available beforehand.Coercion is often linked to repression, but the two are not the same.When I coerce you, I leave you worse off. When I repress you, I preventyou from signaling your protest – your dissatisfaction with the outcome.Repression can be political, but it can also be economic or financial.Applied to political markets, repression means the silencing of discontent.Economic and financial repression refers to the administrative controlsthat conceal market stress, which would otherwise be signaled by risingprices or interest rates. Such controls include price and interest caps andallocation by rationing and licensing.Conflict, coercion, and repression have in common the exercise offorce. Force requires “adversarial investments” and so is costly to produceand use. This is what makes them all negative-sum activities – as distinctfrom trade, which gives rise to a positive sum. After I have forced you todo what you would not have chosen to do willingly, our joint wealth isless than it was before. My power allows me to gain, only by imposing aloss on you. If you resist, and I impose my power on you by force orthreats, our joint wealth is diminished, and the smallest loss I mustimpose on you in order to gain myself must be larger by that amount.
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Just as conflict does not have to end in violence, coercion need not beviolent either, but there is generally violence when coercion is resisted. Itcould be that you refuse the inferior choice set that I offer you (“Yourmoney or your life”). This suggests that my power appeared inadequate atfirst, and required some demonstration or reinforcement. Or, conflictarises as a prelude to coercion, if I attack you (or you attack me)preemptively, to demonstrate superior coercive means. In other words,violence expresses actual or potential resistance to coercion and istherefore linked to the scope for coercion to fail.In what I have written so far, coercion is never productive. Thatperspective is perhaps too narrow, or rather it accurately reflects a bias inmy research. To explain further, in the example of the highwayman,coercion was used to steal your property, and this could be thought of asdestructive not only of your personal entitlement but also of the generalsystem of property rights. A system of property rights that can beenforced within the law is generally recognized as one of the hallmarks ofa well-ordered society. In that case, it would seem a good idea for thepublic to apply some coercion to the highwayman. With the rightcombination of stick and carrot, a reformed highwayman might even gainin the long run. Then, coercion would be productive of a social benefit.2In a well-ordered society, coercion enforces the law, but it is alsorestrained by the law. Here, law enforcement and legal restraint are twosides of the same coin. One importance of legal restraint is to underpinthe community’s consent to the laws that are enforced. It is different inthe other sort of society, the sort that is not “well-ordered.” There,coercion enforces the will of the government, not the rule of law. In thatcase government is, as the OED puts it, “by force, as opposed to that whichrests upon the will of the community governed.”Law enforcement and public coercion subject to the law are veryimportant subjects for history and social science. On the whole, however,my research has addressed other aspects of public coercion, those thathave lent support to arbitrary power including the unrestrainedenforcement of arbitrary laws, when the government is relativelyunconcerned about personal freedoms and private entitlements and does
2 In a similar spirit Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2012) limit theirdefinition of conflict to exclude those investments in adversarial meansthat bring external benefits to third parties. They intend this to excludefrom the sphere of conflict the competitive tournaments and sportingevents that raise productivity or provide enjoyment. Investments inpolicing under the rule of law also provide external benefits to thirdparties and on the same logic they should also be excluded from ourdefinition of conflict.
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not answer to the courts, the electorate, or anyone but itself. In the casesthat I have studied, coercion was generally associated with repression,because the government did not regard the victims of coercion as entitledto any legal redress or legitimate expression of protest.The chapters in this book are mainly about conflict and coercion thatis organized among states and groups. The state is present in everychapter, sometimes as the body that seeks to monopolize violence over itssubjects, sometimes as the main source of violence within global society.In the long run of human history the monopolization of lawful violenceby the state has been one factor in the great diminution of interpersonalviolence in the world since early times (Gat 2006; Pinker 2011; North,Wallis, and Weingast 2011). But “lawful violence” must be understoodcarefully; it implies that alongside the state’s monopolization of violencecome acceptance of the rule of law, including private property rights andother rights of the citizens vis à vis the state. A problem here is that thesource of these laws is the sovereign state and the source of internationallaw is agreement among sovereigns. All sovereigns are subject to theWeingast (1995) paradox: “A government strong enough to protectproperty rights and enforce contracts is also strong enough to confiscatethe wealth of its citizens.” On the same reasoning, a state that is powerfulenough to monopolize violence is also powerful enough to exercise itwithout restraint against its own citizens and against other states.If public coercion and conflict among states are so closely related intheory, the connection should be reflected in the facts. And it is:Empirically, as discussed in Chapter 4, coercion and conflict often arisetogether because coercive political regimes are very often sources ofconflict among states.Before the modern era, virtually all states were authoritarian andwarfare was the main function of the nation state. In European history, asCharles Tilly (1975, p. 42) observed, “War made the state and states madewar.” This relationship between the nation state and warfare began tobreak down only as governments became democratic, and acquiredadditional functions, and at the same time the rule of law took the place ofrule by men.There are many reasons why states based on the rule of law (Kant1795/1983) and democracy (de Tocqueville 1835/2000) might beexpected to prefer peace. These range from moral considerations, such asreluctance to spill blood except in self-defence, to the self-interest ofpoliticians and governments under democratic arrangements.Normatively, societies that subject themselves to the rule of law are likelyto extend the same protection to foreigners as to their own citizens. Thestructure of democracy may also impose restraints on democratic leaders;empirically, leaders that lose wars are more likely to lose office in
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democracies than in autocracies (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995).Whatever the reason, it is “as close as anything we have to an empiricallaw in international relations” that “liberal or democratic states do notfight each other” (Levy 1988, p. 662).Given the close links between coercion and conflict, it is not surprisingthat the toolkits that the economist applies to these two topics are largelythe same.
Rational calculationThe single most important instrument that the economist brings to bear isthe idea of rational choice. Without it, social science is nothing more thana psychological novel in which people are driven by inner forces theyneither understand nor control. Are people sometimes driven by innerforces they neither understand nor control? Certainly. But there must bemore to it than this, or the practice of social science becomes impossible.When choices are rational, that is, calculated, each person is thought toweigh up the expected costs and benefits to themselves of the possibleactions and to choose the one that offers the greatest surplus (or thesmallest loss). As Clausewitz (1832/1982, p. 119) wrote:War is a mere continuation of policy by other means ... War is notmerely a political act, but also a real political instrument, acontinuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same byother means.Consider the idea of optimization based on the computation of costsand benefits to oneself and the balancing of first order conditions, and callit “pure” rationality. Does that fully describe human nature as we find itexpressed in empirical patterns of behaviour? Clearly not. It cannotaccount, for example, for people who destroy themselves or the thingsand people they love – at least, it cannot account for this in the form I havestated it. But is it a useful starting point? Very much so, because, as Iwrote in another context (Harrison 2005):If people do what they want, subject to the resource and informationconstraints that we can identify, and if we do not understand whatthey do, then we are missing something important and we should notbe satisfied to throw up our hands.Consider a country threatened with overwhelming force. For the sakeof argument the country is Poland and the year is 1939. Hitler wishes toacquire the Polish homeland and this is something that most Poles wouldprefer to avoid. But avoidance is not on offer, so their real choice is
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between surrender and fighting to defeat. Fighting is destructive and somust leave everyone worse off than in the case of surrender. Thinking onlines of pure rationality, a deal is available that would leave both sidesbetter off than if war broke out, so both sides should accept it. The Polesshould agree to give away the value of their homeland (which they willlose anyway), and accept from Germany in compensation a proportion ofwhat will be saved by abstaining from resistance. For the Germans thisshould be an acceptable deal, since they will gain Poland and the Poles’compensation will cost them less than they would have spent on violence.For some it is a problem that that’s not what happened. The crazyPoles did not surrender, but fought until they were defeated. Our model ofpure rationality is a failure, apparently.Actually, no. The model has told us that we are missing something, andin that sense it is a success: it has extended our interface with theunknown. When we see human agents doing something that is costly, theprinciple of rationality tells us that they must expect to gain some futurebenefit (or avoid some future loss) that is equal or greater. If we missed it,we need to work out what it was.What were we missing? I’ll consider five different ways ofunderstanding the rationality of Polish resistance to Germany in 1939.These are all factors in the motivation of conflict that are important foreconomists – and others – to understand, and at bottom they all point inthe same direction. These factors are entitlement, reputation, identity,uncertainty, bounded rationality, and credibility. The first four would notautomatically prevent coming to an agreement, although they wouldmake coming to an agreement or less likely, more difficult, or more costlyto Germany. The fifth, credibility, would seem to rule an agreement out,making war inevitable.3
Entitlement refers to the established fact that we value somethingmore when it is already ours – when we consider that it belongs to us byright. This is one of the foundations of modern behavioural economics(e.g. Kahnemann, Knetsch, and Thaler 1991). This suggests a reason whythe Poles were ready to fight: they considered Poland was theirs, and thevalue of resistance was the defence of their entitlement.
3 Fearon (1995) lays out further grounds that may prevent agreementand lead to war within a rational-choice framework:. Even whenagreement is possible, each side still wishes to secure the best agreementpossible. To achieve this, the government may try to exploit privateinformation and strategic misrepresentation in such a way thatagreement is impeded. These do not seem applicable to Poland in 1939,but can still be relevant elsewhere.
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Another factor can be reputation. According to the historian AnnaCienciala (2011), Polish leaders of the time such as foreign minister JózefBeck put honour above the avoidance of conflict. If they had given awaywhat was theirs without a fight, accepting a vassal state for Poland, theywould have lost their honour. In this view the value of resistance was thesafeguarding of their honour, even if they lost everything else.The concept of identity fills a gap in economics (Akerlof and Kranton2000) Economists often describe economic behaviour as the rationalpursuit of self-interest. But who are we, and how can we define our self-interest without first establishing who we are? “I could not live withmyself if I did not …”: their own self-identification is often a person’s mostprecious possession, and occasionally one for which life itself must besacrificed. Thus, the paradox of behaviors that lead to self-destructionincluding suicide, suicidal terrorism, and suicidal heroism, cannot beunderstood except in terms of the self that such behaviours defend(Harrison 2006). If they had not fought for Poland, the Poles would nothave been Poles. Thus the value of resistance was to safeguard a preciousidentity that would otherwise have been destroyed.Our analysis would be grossly incomplete if we did not take intoaccount that identity has many dimensions. The Poles were not just Poles.They were also men, women, and children; elites and poor; Jews and non-Jews; soldiers and civilians; religious and secular; nationalists andinternationalists; and so on. They surely did not weigh up everything thesame way. Poland was a young nation, and national entitlement, honour,and identity are the currency of nation-building leaders. Honour wasquite possibly of more value to the elite than to the foot soldiers that werealso going to have to die for it. Disputes are more likely to be resolvedthrough violence when identities become polarized (Sen 2006).This reminds us, finally, that it is not nations that optimize, butpersons. Each person frames the choices of others; each person in thenation must decide their own self-interest, given the choices that theyexpect others to make. This interaction is something else that was missingfrom our first attempt at “pure” rationalism.One factor in Polish resistance may have been uncertainty over futurecosts and benefits. Our model was framed by the assumption that if itcame to a conflict the Polish defeat was certain. In reality war is a gamble:“No plan of operations can look with certainty beyond the first meetingwith the major forces of the enemy," wrote the older Moltke (cited byHolborn 1986, p. 289). Every Pole remembered the “miracle on theVistula” of 1920, when the Red Army’s apparently unstoppable advanceon Warsaw was halted by an unexpectedly successful Polish counter-attack. It is clear that Germany’s Wehrmacht in 1939 was far more of anexistential threat to Poland than Soviet Russia’s Red Army in 1920. There
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was no room for Polish optimism in any objective reading of the balanceof forces. They were almost certainly going to lose.Our bounded rationality restricts our capacity to make the rightdecision (for a recent summary see Kahneman 2012). The limits arecognitive as well as computational. Among other things, we overvaluesmall probabilities – for example, the chances of a second “miracle on theVistula” within two decades of the first. Members of the Polish elite, withshared experience of service in the dragoons, were likely to see a cavalrycharge as part of the solution to Poland’s problem, even if Poland’sproblem had no solution at all.Finally, any deal that Germany could have put on the table would nothave been credible. In fact, the secrecy of Germany’s war preparations,including the secret pact with Stalin that opened Hitler’s way into Poland,shows that Hitler did not even try to offer the Poles a deal that could avoidwar in 1939. Nor would the Poles have been wise to accept one if it wasoffered. Whatever agreement Hitler might have made before a Polishsurrender, he would surely not have kept his word afterwards. This wasthe same Hitler that had recently swallowed Austria, the CzechSudetenland, and Czechoslovakia itself. He had a clear record of makingpromises when it suited him to do so and breaking them afterwards whenit suited him. Any deal that Hitler offered to the Poles would not havebeen credible. They would not have responded to the attempt, and he didnot bother to try.The model of rationality that we began with exemplifies the saying ofthe statistician George Box (1987, p. 74): “All models are wrong; thepractical question is how wrong do they have to be to not be useful.” Theidea of rational choice is wrong because it is oversimplified, but it is notso wrong that it is useless. Used properly, it can still guide us to a fullerunderstanding of the choices that people make, even in situationscharacterized by ignorance, anxiety, and existential threat.
Strategic interactionStrategy has many meanings in the modern world, most of them onlydistantly related to its roots. Strategy begins with prediction of the future,and many public and private organizations claim to have “strategic plans”that are really just aspirational descriptions of the state in which theywould like to be in a few years’ time. There the word “strategic” is empty,because any plan is about the future, and calling it strategic adds nothing.The origin of the word strategy lies with generalship. The main task ofthe general is to predict and counteract the action of some adversary orrival. He must decide his best action (for example, to advance along agiven front), not knowing the enemy’s deployment but trying to predict it
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based on the fact that the enemy is simultaneously trying to predict thegeneral’s line of advance in order to decide where to deploy his defences.“What does planning mean in war?” Answering his own question, Stalin’sMarshal Ivan Konev (1970) wrote, “We make plans alone but carry themout, if one can put it so, in company with the enemy, that is, taking intoaccount his counteraction.” It is this simultaneity and mutual engagementthat captures the spirit of strategic interaction.When we act strategically, we may or may not reveal our truepreferences, or we may even conceal them. We may line the streets tocheer a hated tyrant. We may prefer peace but nonetheless plan for war.Modern social science uses game theory to think about strategicinteraction. While many particular games are studied in the contexts ofconflict and coercion, one is canonical (Fearon 1995). Suppose you have aresource that I want, that you would not give me freely, but only if Icoerce you. In a dispute among states this resource might be your land; ina domestic setting it might be your labour. Set the value of this resourceequal to 1. We can resolve our conflict with or without violence. Violencecosts me ௜ܿand you ௨ܿ (think of these costs as proportions of the value atstake, which is the unit of account).4 Then the structure of payoffs mightlook as in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Conflict over resources
The game played in the figure works like this. If I make my demand,and you yield, the resource changes hands from you to me. If you resistand I win, I gain the resource less the cost to me of violence; you lose theresource and the cost to you of violence. If you win, nothing changeshands and we both lose the costs of our own violence.
4 Other assumptions are that we are risk-neutral and we havecommon values and full information, so there is no scope for the privateinformation and strategic misrepresentation issues discussed by Fearon(1995).
I demand
You resist You yield(1, –1)
I win1 − ௜ܿ,−1− ௨ܿ You win− ௜ܿ,− ௨ܿ
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This game yields simple, intuitive results that also illustrate theprinciple of strategic interaction. Should I make my demand? On the faceof it, if I expect you not to resist, or if I expect to gain from a fight. Both ofthese depend on the probability p of my winning if it comes to violence.Find our expected payoffs from violence by applying p to my winningpayoff and 1 − ݌ to yours. Then, you will be willing to fight me if youexpect to gain from it, i.e. 1 − ݌− ௎ܿ > 0; otherwise, you will yieldwithout a fight. I will be willing to fight you if I expect to come out aheadfrom a conflict, i.e. ݌− ܿ௜> 0. Unfortunately for the prospects of peacefulconflict resolution, both of these conditions can hold at the same time;they require only that the resource will not be completely consumed bythe costs of violence, i.e. ௜ܿ+ ௨ܿ < 1. Violence can be avoided only if it isso costly in prospect that a fight would destroy everything.Missing from this setup is the option to bargain peacefully. That scopefor negotiation ought to exist is shown by the fact that beforehand thevalue at stake is one unit whereas, after a value-destroying conflict, themost there can be to distribute between us is 1 − ௜ܿ− ௨ܿ. By agreementwe can save the value that otherwise would be destroyed ( ௜ܿ+ ௨ܿ) andshare this among ourselves. My outcome can then be better than ݌− ௜ܿand yours can be better than 1 − ݌− ௨ܿ. As we have already discussed,however, the likelihood of a bargain is dramatically reduced or eliminatedaltogether by the problem that rulers who are willing to use violence toget their way, whether domestically or internationally, may also be unableto commit to agreements that avoid it.This game is sometimes called divide-the-dollar (two players bid for adollar; if their bids sum to less than the dollar, they receive their bids, orotherwise nothing). While international relations provide its usualsetting, the divide-the-dollar game can also be used to illustrate theoutcomes of domestic conflict under a coercive regime. The failure ofSoviet economic reforms provides an example. The “dollar” (or ruble)here is the additional resources that would have been supplied if Sovietmanagers had honestly reported their assets and capabilities to thegovernment, if their workers had given their working time fully tomeeting management goals, and if the government could have committedto reward the managers and workers in return, in other words, to dividethe ruble with them.In 1929, Stalin began to transform the Soviet economy into acentralized command system. By centralizing economic controls he wasable to enforce a near-complete monopoly of capital and a monopsony ofwage labour and farmers’ food surpluses. Between 1928 and 1940,increases in compulsory work norms and production quotas andreductions in real wages brought about a transfer of roughly 30 percent ofSoviet GNP (measured at factor costs of 1937) from household
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consumption to other uses, particularly investment and defence (Bergson1961, p. 237).In a market economy many workers would have responded to such asqueeze by looking elsewhere. They would have been free to find non-government buyers for their products or services or in the last resort toemigrate. Under communist rule these options were criminalized andheavily punished. In the Soviet Union most workers were limited to“inside” options which meant, for example, showing up to work butreducing effort and attention to quality. (Some important exceptions arethe subject of Chapters 7 and 8.)There was a vicious circle, summed up in the Soviet-era joke: “Wepretend to work and they pretend to pay us.” At intervals over the nexthalf century Soviet leaders made various efforts to unlock this viciouscircle. The key, they believed, was to reward managers and workers fortaking on more ambitious norms and quotas. Among these efforts, mostprominent were the rate-busters’ movement inspired in 1935 by the coalminer Aleksei Stakhanov, and the postwar management and incentivereforms of 1965sponsored by prime minister Aleksei Kosygin.The problem was that government promises to divide the ruble byletting the workers keep the rewards for increased effort were notcredible. Enterprises that played the government’s game tended to berewarded only in the short term. Once they had revealed what they weretruly capable of, they had given away their main bargaining chip innegotiating the next quota. In the longer term they were given highernorms and quotas and so lost their promised share of the ruble (Harrison2002).In this sense (if no other) the structure of the problem that Sovietworkers faced with government promises in 1965 was identical to theone that the Poles faced with Hitler’s demands in 1939: afterimplementing any bargain, they could anticipate that the terms would beshifted against them, and they would have given away their power toresist, so it was better not to make any deal and slug it out. As a result theequilibrium outcome of seeking to divide the ruble in the Soviet version ofthe game was low effort, low productivity, and endemic, unresolvedconflict over norms and quotas.In game theory terms the models shown here are highly simplified.5They serve mainly to illustrate the structure of strategic interaction.Although very simple, they have the virtue of suggesting how
5 In more advanced games we find that players will behave differentlygiven opportunities to throw dice, anticipate repetition, learn about eachother, form beliefs, build reputations, and purvey misinformation. Fordiscussion of historical applications see Greif (2006).
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governments and their adversaries had no choice but to put themselves ineach other’s shoes in order to identify their own best choices, whether theadversaries were foreign leaders or their own subjects. This is the essenceof strategic interaction.
Increasing and diminishing returnsStrategic interaction has other features that make clear its affinity to thesubject of coercion and conflict. One is the importance of activities inwhich there are increasing returns at the margin. Most economicactivities are characterized by diminishing marginal returns, and mosteconomic models assume it.“Diminishing returns” sounds like a gloomy sort of thing, but inpractice it is what keeps society on the rails most of the time.6 I like aglass of wine, but I enjoy the second glass less than the first. As a result Ilimit my consumption. Beyond a point, I stop. In other words, processescharacterized by diminishing returns tend to be self-limiting and arrivesooner or later at a point of stability (which economists call equilibrium).The same processes would become explosive in the presence ofincreasing returns. If I enjoyed every glass more than the one before, Iwould quickly drink myself into unconsciousness. At the same time, if Idid not enjoy the first glass very much, I might never start. In other words,my life would go to extremes: I would either be completely sober or therewould be no stopping me.In conflict and coercion there are often increasing returns, although ina sense that differs a little from the example of my drinking habit. In thiscase it is not my effort that makes returns diminish or increase, but theefforts of others. Figure 2 has two panels. Panel (A) illustrates diminishingreturns. Think of an industry that has a given market for its product.Working in that industry has certain costs, which are also taken as given.When few workers are engaged in the industry they command a highwage, so it is profitable for others to join them. Workers flow into theindustry, but this also reduces the wage. Conversely, with too manyworkers engaged in the industry the wage is driven below the cost ofworking in the industry, and workers are driven out. Whichever side ofthe equilibrium point you begin from, the process stops in the middle,where the number of people engaged is such that the benefit to the
6 David Hugh Jones highlighted this point for me in a blog post, “Verysimple thoughts about the politics of crisis,” (7 April 2013), available athttp://davidhughjones.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/very-simple-thoughts-about-politics-of.html (accessed 7 April 2013).
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joining worker just matches the cost of doing so. The result is a stableequilibrium. This is the normal world of everyday production and trade.
Figure 2. Increasing and diminishing returns
Panel (B) illustrates increasing returns. This covers situations wherethe private benefit to a person of doing something increases with thenumber of other people that are doing the same thing at the same time.Imagine a war of attrition, in which two armies grind each other down.The battle is won by the last man standing. In that battle, the moresoldiers join in on my side, the more likely I am to be that last manstanding. But if you, the soldier next to me, turn and run, that exposes meto the enemy and reduces my chance of survival. As each additionalsoldier falls out of the ranks, they reduce the benefit to me of continuingto fight. As I watch you, I ask myself continually: Should I run too? If thatcalculation ripples along the line, the army unravels suddenly into afleeing mob, and the battle is lost.Under these circumstances war becomes a game of all or nothing: weall join in together, or we all run for it. There is no balance between thetwo.A similar example works for political coercion. My block leader ordersme to fall into line with my neighbours and sing with them: “All hail ourglorious leader!” How should I respond? My first response may not be toquestion whether the leader is really glorious but to find out what otherswill do. If my neighbours are evenly divided, I might feel free to go withmy inner beliefs. If I hear they will all march and sing, my private feelingsabout our leader may be overwhelmed by the likely cost to me if I make a
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stand on my own and register dissent. If other people show resistance,however, even if I am the biggest coward on the street, I should bear inmind that it is also dangerous to be a hated tyrant’s last supporter.In other words, for anyone who is not an instinctive rebel, conforminghas returns that increase with the number of other people that conform.The trick is to predict the standard to which one should conform. Hencethe common phenomenon of “weathervanes” – people whose professedopinions follow the prevailing orthodoxy.In the explosive world of increasing returns there is no longer just oneequilibrium. Rather than getting slightly inebriated, I will either becompletely sober or unconscious. The army will either hold or collapse.The regime will be stable until it falls suddenly; the crowd will be fickle,and everyone will be strongly “for” until they turn “against.” To make myown best choices I must continually try to work out how everyone elsewill behave, knowing incidentally that they are also trying to predict myown behaviour, which is more or less the definition of strategicinteraction. This is, finally, a world of agonizing dilemmas: every day Imust weigh integrity against survival.The role of increasing returns should not be overstated. In wartime,many returns continue to diminish, and this accounts for importantregularities. The airplane was an invention of the twentieth century, andin the 1930s most major powers gave a lot of resources to this newweapon. But beyond a point they stopped, and also modernized theirarmies and navies. This recognized diminishing returns to air power:sooner or later, they got a point where they figured the military value ofone more plane would fall below the same value assigned to one more ofthe traditional guns or ships. They also limited rearmament somewherearound the point where the expected value of one more dollar given to thearmy fell below the value of the same given to agriculture or public works.Even in total war, this principle continued to apply: even when the threatwas existential, no country gave literally everything to the war.The returns to coercion also diminish beyond a point. An extreme caseof coercion is provided by the residents of Stalin’s labour camps. Behindthe barbed wire of the Gulag, men and women were stripped of nearly allpossessions, nearly all family contact, and nearly all control over time andmovement. All their choices left them worse off. Yet, what did experienceshow? You can put a man in these conditions, and point a gun at his head,and it can still be hard to make him work. As Chapter 10 shows, theexpansion of the Gulag saw the evolution of ever more varied andcomplex incentive schemes that were designed for no other purpose thanto persuade the slaves to work. The stick and the carrot were notalternatives. Even when the main emphasis fell on the stick, Stalin stillhad to give out a few carrots. In other words, there were limits to
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coercion. Not even a totalitarian dictator could overcome diminishingreturns.In short, both diminishing and increasing returns are essentialinstruments in the toolkit that everyone needs to understand conflict andcoercion, and the problem is largely to understand which one to apply ineach context.
Scale and state capacityIn conflict, scale might seem unambiguously good. Since Clausewitz,modern strategists have thought of the ideal military campaign as theapplication of overwhelming force to the enemy’s weak points. Sometimesit worked quickly, sometimes not. When it dragged out, modern conflictoften became a war of attrition in which victory would be claimed by thelast man standing on the field of battle. Whether warfare took the form ofa lightning blow or a bloody slog, why would less ever be worth morethan more?In fact, the wars of the twentieth century have been historicallyexceptional. If we go back through history it is relatively easy to findbattles in which smaller armies were able to inflict overwhelming defeatson much larger forces. At Marathon (490BC) a Greek army numbered inthousands routed a Persian force of five to ten times the size. TheCarthaginians achieved a similar victory over Rome at Cannae (216BC).The English did it to the French twice in a century at Crécy (1346) andAgincourt (1415).In such cases the smaller force defeated the larger one not so muchbecause of an advantage of equipment or terrain but by disrupting theopposing force to a point where it suddenly changed state, from a properarmy to an uncoordinated rabble that could easily be slaughtered. Attimes, it seems as though the smaller force was easier to hold together byties of discipline and comradeship than a larger force where each had asmaller chance of a part in the fighting and felt less commitment andobligation to the cause of the whole.Something that defines modern war, dating it from the time ofNapoleon, is the emergence of mass armies that could be held together indefeat. Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, the Confederate retreat fromGettysburg, the Japanese retreat to the home islands from South East Asiaand the South Pacific, and the German retreat from Stalingrad and theCaucasus are all examples of vast bodies of men that somehow failed todisintegrate despite pulverizing defeats that were piled one on top ofanother for months and years.If every great army of the twentieth century had disintegrated onsuffering a great defeat, as the French army did in 1940, both world wars
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would have been over within months. The fact that they often did not, butwere held together and retained their military capabilities, ensured thatmodern war became a war of resources, in which those armies won thatcould throw the greater number of men and munitions into battle and stillhad men standing on the battlefield when the battle was over.In short, to have a war of resources, two great armies must meet, fight,and neither of them fall apart – something that seems to have happenedquite rarely before the twentieth century. The question that follows is:When do armies fall apart, and when not? This is not an economicquestion, but it is one that economists have considered. Brennan andTullock (1982) cast the soldier’s motivation in the framework of aprisoner’s dilemma: unless some other factor enters the soldier’scalculation, whether his comrades stand and fight or turn and run, in theface of battle his best choice is always to desert. Officers buildcomradeship and discipline to prevent this from happening.In history defeat has come most often, not at the point when all thesoldiers are killed, but at the point when discipline and mutual obligationfail so that the army is suddenly pulled apart and is turned into aleaderless rabble. Modern armies, however, have evolved into resilientnetworks based on morale and commitment that can overcome theprisoner’s dilemma and hold the ranks together even in quite extremecircumstances. When this factor was equally present on both sides,improved leadership and morale could no longer make the differencebetween victory and defeat. It was under these conditions, and only then,that scale and resources could become the decisive factor in two worldwars.Scale in modern warfare has implications for the state. To assemble anarmy of modest size for a season, fight a battle, and then disperse is onething. To keep a mass army supplied and moving from battle to battle inone season after another is another. As shown in Chapters 1 and 2, thedemands of twentieth century warfare have sometimes required themobilization of half or more of a country’s resources for years on end. Toachieve this required immense state capacity.State capacity has many dimensions, financial and administrative aswell as coercive (Besley and Persson 2009). The raising of war loans andtaxes and the coordination and direction of human and physical resourcesinto the supply of modern wars produced a vast derived demand forprofessional, non-corrupt administrative services. Autocracies of the pre-modern era had very limited capacity of this type. It was the seventeenthcentury revolutions, guaranteeing private property and constitutionalrule in Northwestern Europe, that also gave unprecedented power togovernment to tax and borrow in the event of war. In military and navalpower the liberal democracies pulled ahead of their rivals, keeping the
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advantage through World War I. As shown in Chapters 1 to 4, however, byWorld War II some non-democracies had caught up and closed the gap,exploiting modern nationalism and repression to mobilize resources withstill greater intensity, at least for short periods of time.If pure scale has had the edge in modern warfare, does the same carryover to the exercise of coercion? That is, is it better to be the tyrant of abig country compared with a small one? To rule a large country iscertainly more complex, and complexity is costly. As ruler of the world’slargest territory, Stalin had to commit major resources to the control ofthe vast Soviet space and to border regions inhabited by ethnic minoritiesfrom the Baltic to Mongolia and China. To ensure the implementation ofhis orders, he had to rely on ever lengthening chains of command andmultiple, overlapping agencies of control (Markevich 2012). CompareStalin’s problem with that of Alyaksandr Lukashenka. Once a politicalinstructor of the KGB border troops, Lukashenka rose to become theautocratic ruler of the former Soviet republic of Belarus. In Belarus, hegoverns no more than three percent of the population and one percent ofthe territory of the old Soviet Union. That is surely a simpler task thanStalin’s.Perhaps it is better to be a pike in a small pond than a minnow in alake. But it is better still to rule the lake. The reasons are things we havealready seen. First, dictators appear to have a propensity for war. Second,in modern war, scale counts.
Surplus extractionThe economic analysis of coercion and conflict encourages, in some ways,a return to Marxian ideas about the economy. One of Marx’s (1867/1974,pp. 173-182) central obsessions was his idea of surplus value: the valuethat a worker creates for the employer, above and beyond his own value(or maintenance cost). This idea was so important to Marx because heregarded all economies as, in essence, mechanisms whereby an elite ofone kind or another extracted a surplus from the working poor.Modern economics has abandoned this view as oversimplified to anextreme. The model is not only wrong; it is not useful in most contexts. Inthe Marxian perspective there is only one kind of surplus, called profit,one source of surplus, called labour, and one recipient, the capitalist class.In the competitive market economy of today’s textbooks everytransaction gives rise to a surplus, and these accrue to the producers andconsumers that are party to every transaction. In other words, there aresurpluses everywhere and they accrue to everyone; they are not themonopoly of one class.
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At the same time, there are some economies that are undeniablyextractive. In these economies there is a restricted class of proprietor, orperhaps a dictator, that controls production and distribution in a coerciveway, for its own exclusive benefit. In extractive economies there is oftenno clear distinction between politics and economics, because the securityof the proprietors rests on forcible restriction of the choices available tomembers of the underclass, not on universal property rights and the ruleof law. In other words, the same people that want to monopolize theeconomy must also monopolize the state.Manorial economies, plantation and slave economies, and communistcommand economies seem to fit this template better than others. Inspiredby the example of Stalin’s Soviet Union, Mancur Olson (1993) developedthe idea of a “proprietary dictator” that defeats rivals, monopolizes aterritory. and extracts a surplus from it. Where competing predatorswould simply ruin the territory, a monopolistic ruler would rationallyseek to expand the territory and even be willing to pay for public goodsand infrastructure to make it more productive, because this will raise theoutput of the territory and so increase his revenues in the long run.In this model economic development is not the dictator’s purpose, butit is an incidental by-product of the dictator’s desire to increase thesurplus over time. As the example of the Soviet Union suggests, extractiveregimes have sometimes been associated with prolonged growth spurts,but they have never given rise to the modern economic growth thatpersists unbroken for a century. One important reason may be that themonopolization of resources by an elite is antithetical to the “creativedestruction” of market competition (Açemoglu and Robinson 2012, p. 94).The analysis of the downfall of the Soviet model in Chapters 11 and 12strongly suggests a link with its failure to respond to the opportunitiespresented by new technologies and new industries that were spurringmarket-economy development and globalization in the 1970s and 1980s.Marxists used to lay great emphasis on international movements ofeconomic surpluses. Economic historians somewhat lost interest in thissubject after it became clear that international trade before thenineteenth century was simply not large enough to be a channel forsignificant transfers from one country to another (O’Brien 1982).Quantitative history suggests that this topic became much moreimportant in twentieth century conquest (Liberman 1996). Germany’soccupation of much of Europe in World War II arose out of long-termplans for territorial expansion but the design of the occupation regimewas motivated more narrowly by plans to extract a surplus of food andresources from the occupied countries by coercive means and transfer itto Germany or the German Army. A new study by Klemann andKudryashov (2012, p. 104) estimates the actual contribution at around
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one third of Germany’s war costs. (Further calculations would be requiredto estimate the additional surplus extracted within Germany from theslave labourers imported from occupied Europe.)The importance of the economic surplus for our subject goes beyondits role in communist and fascist states. In total war, all economiesbecame extractive. Even in democracies, the elected government had tofind resources for the army and its equipment. The resources had to comefrom somewhere. Beyond a point, the working poor had to be squeezedbecause they were the only class of society numerous enough to supplythe necessary resources.In short, to understand what overlords and dictators maximize, andhow they maximize it, and to understand what all governments mustmaximize in total war, Marx’s intuition remains useful. Although neitherof the authors is a Marxist, the surplus model that we apply to Sovietlabour coercion in Chapter 10 is consistent with a Marxian approach. Torepeat George Box, all models are wrong – and that certainly includes themodel that Marx developed. But wrong models can still yield insight, andthe Marxian model is one of these. It too has a place in the economist’stoolkit.
Type I ErrorsOne way that social science advances is by formulating and testinghypotheses against data. Evolution has programmed us all to formulatehypothesis all the time, that is, to look for patterns around us and findsignificance in chains of events. Our ability to do this has given us hugeadvantages as a species. Without it there would be no science, technology,religion, or culture: we could not understand the universe, manipulate thelaws of physics, build social relationships, or peer into the future.Imposing significance upon chains of events so as to look into the future issomething from which an extraordinarily wide range of people can makea living both for themselves and for others, for example politicians,priests, tipsters, entrepreneurs, novelists, journalists, economists, andhistorians.7Our propensity to discover patterns in what we observe is not onlycreative. It is also a source of risk. The risk is realized when we make
7 Here I draw on material that I wrote for a blog post asking “How CanWe Get to See What's Coming Round the Corner?” (August 6, 2009),available athttp://blogs.warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/entry/can_we_see/, and also(from the time before blogs) a short unpublished paper, “The War AgainstTerrorism: Type I Versus Type II Errors” (1 November 2001), available athttp://warwick.ac.uk/markharrison/comment/.
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mistakes. The mistakes we make can be of two kinds, which statisticianscall Type I and Type II. These concepts arise from statistics rather thaneconomics, but they are of fundamental importance to the economics ofcoercion and conflict.
 An error of Type I is to see a pattern in the data where in realitythere is none. On a dark night you hear the footsteps of an attackerbehind you, but actually no one is there.
 An error of Type II is to miss a pattern in the data that is actuallypresent. Another night, an attacker comes behind you. You’redistracted and unaware until it’s too late.Which is worse? Both carry dangers. People that persistently makeerrors of Type II can be described as complacent. They fail continually tosee the risks of terrorism and war and the environmental and healthhazards around the corner. As a result, bad things are allowed to happenbefore we take action. Complacent people wake up in the end, only afterthey and others have suffered significant damage which, given betterforesight, could have been avoided. They lock the stable door after thehorse has bolted. Thus Type II errors can be corrected but correction iscostly.Type I errors are bad too. The people that persistently make errors ofType I can be called paranoid. They see enemies and conspiracieseverywhere. The world is complicated; they think the world is acomplicated gun that someone, somewhere is pointing at them. Theydon’t recognise that many things are random; they won’t accept that badstuff often happens by accident or by mistake. Nor are they able to acceptthat a lot of what happens is not really about them at all. Trying toforestall the bad things they anticipate, people who are gripped by Type Ierrors are often themselves responsible for doing things that are as bador worse, such as mobilizing society to solve problems that do not exist orattacking people who are not enemies and would prefer to keepthemselves to themselves.Finally, there is a trade-off between the errors of Type I and Type II. Ifwe try harder to avoid one, other things being equal, we will inevitablyend up making more of the other. The only way to reduce both types oferror at the same time is to have more and better data. As long as datacollection is costly, we will never have complete information and we willalways have to balance one kind of error against the other.Attitudes to the consequences of Type I and Type II errors haveproved to be important markers of social attitudes. Understanding thebalance that is struck between Type I and Type II errors can tell you a lotabout the nature of the society under study. In a court of law, the researchhypothesis is that the defendant is guilty. Let’s say the crime is a publicorder offence. Here the court can make two mistakes. It can convict the
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truly innocent (a Type I error) or acquit the truly guilty (a Type II error).In most liberal democracies, the courts are stacked against theprosecution, which must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt that thedefendant incited a riot. In other words, prioritizing the rights of theaccused implies that we tolerate Type II errors in order to avoid errors ofType I, which we see as particularly costly.In contrast the historical record of dictators is that, since they are notparticularly concerned about the rights of citizens, but very concerned toprotect their own skins, they tend to operate criminal justice in a way thatscoops up and penalizes many fairly innocent people in order to ensurethat every guilty person is taken out of circulation. This has importantimplications for the study of coercion. As discussed in Chapter 10, thecoercive regimes of the dictators that preside over extractive economiestypically accept large numbers of Type I errors as the price of avoiding theType II errors that might undermine their own security. In contrast, moreinclusive economies that respect the rights of individual citizens tend tohave arrangements, such as presuming innocence in the absence of proofof guilt, that avoid Type I errors at the price of sometimes making Type IIerrors.The asymmetry in the consequences of Type I and Type II errors hasstrongly affected the research strategies of natural and social scientists.Most scientists would rather not be personally responsible for precipitateaction that wastes resources and destroys lives. Therefore, science iscautious, and standard criteria for statistical significance put much moreweight on avoiding Type I errors than avoiding Type II errors. So the datasupport your hypothesis only weakly? Go back and get a bigger sample, orlet somebody else try; don’t prematurely announce that you’ve identifieda cure for cancer or the root of some other evil.Oddly enough, many historical commentators (including politicians,pundits, and some historians) do not seem to feel this self-restraint. Infact, the quality of historical writing is often judged by the ability of thehistorian to weave a few random threads into an interesting pattern. Mostreaders will be impressed by a story that is logical and is supported bysome data, even though the data points are selected and not at allrepresentative.In relation to our subject matter, wars are especially suited to biasedtreatment because they comprise many great stories in which we canidentify directly with the actors and we are emotionally compelled by thedrama. The same is also true of the history of societies where there hasbeen victimization on a large scale. Every victim has a story to tell and aneed for acknowledgement.Story-telling is powerful. Its intuitive appeal is much greater thanmodels, charts, and numbers. It speaks the language of nations and
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politics: shared experiences, common destinies, collective rights andwrongs. It is easily voiced by leaders and heard by followers untrained instatistical thinking about trends and standard errors. As a result, whilepoliticians may turn to economists for technical advice, they gethistorians to help write their speeches -- Arthur Schlesinger Jr (John F.Kennedy), Richard Pipes (Ronald Reagan), and Norman Stone (MargaretThatcher).What makes the power of story-telling? First, story-telling isdeliberately selective. It does not try to be representative. When we scanhistory for stories, we look by definition for sequences of events that havea beginning, a middle, and an end. In the middle, something happens thatis out of the ordinary, dramatic, and unexpected. Invariably, we rule outall those much more representative past circumstances out of whichsomething might have come, but after which there were no surprises andnothing much happened.Second, stories give us a way of thinking about how to handle rare andunpredictable events. Houghton (1996), for example, has shown how U.S.leaders used historical parallels to make decisions in the “novelemergency” of the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis. In this sense a well-chosenstory (in other words, one data point) can meet the needs of decisionmakers in a much more satisfying way than a statistician who just says:“Well, we need to collect more data.”Third, story-telling typically sounds an alarm. In history, dramaticevents are rarely good news. The good news in history has generally beenmade up of the slow, steady progress of emancipation, literacy, andprosperity. Such good news is easily illustrated by statistics and trends,but does not make good stories. It is the bad news of tragedies and crisesthat makes good stories.In fact, an entirely legitimate purpose of a good story may sometimesbe to sound the alarm about the risks we face and so avert theirrealization. George Orwell’s novel 1984, for example, warned westernsocieties of the dangers of totalitarian rule much more effectively than athousand learned treatises on the subject.There is a downside to this. Some stories can be self-fulfilling. There isa particular kind of collective story, for example, that communal identitypoliticians like to tell (Glaeser 2005). These are stories of past hate crimesallegedly committed by some other ethnic or religious group against theirown group: Black against White, Reds against Whites, Germans againstJews, Jews against Palestinians, Protestants against Catholics, Sunniagainst Shia – and, in all cases, vice versa. Such powerful stories can beextrapolated into predictions of future hate crimes yet to be committed,and then into justifications for hateful and violent action to preempt thefuture crimes.
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When we buy a story that is untrue or unrepresentative, we make aType I error. We accept as meaningful a coincidence between the patternin the story and a pattern inside our brains, despite the fact that thepattern is not matched in the external world. For example, we may prefersome stories to others, not because they are true, but because they aremore comfortable or more affirming of our identity. One result is that thepropensity to Type I errors is strongly present in the history of conflict,where is where national identities are made and affirmed.Consider the following popular hypotheses, which all relate to theoutcome of World War II:
 Britain won the war because the British way of life inspires loyalty.
 Germany (or Japan) almost won the war because Germans (orJapanese) are disciplined and follow orders.
 France lost the war because French society was rotten.
 Italy lost the war because Italians are cowards.
 America won the war because Americans are free and equal.
 The Soviet Union won the war because Russians love their country.These ideas all carry a high risk of Type I error, as a moment’sreflection will indicate. To explain the scope for error in each case: It isdoubtful that Britain could have won the war alone, in other words,without the help of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the BritishEmpire where millions lived in ways that were quite different from thoseof the British at home. If Germany and Japan nearly won the war, it islikely that this was because their leaders planned it that way and it tooktime for others to rise to the challenge; strategy and timing were moreimportant than the innate characteristics of the citizens. If France lost thewar, its society was hardly more rotten than that of others. If Italy lost thewar it was not from cowardice; quite apart from anything else the courageof Italians who resisted the dictator Mussolini must also have been afactor. If America won the war, it was with the participation of largenumbers of slave descendants who were less free and less equal, and itwas also with the help of the Soviet Union whose citizens were ruled by atotalitarian dictator. Finally, if the Soviet Union won the war it wasdespite the best efforts of millions of Russians who collaborated with theoccupier or fought actively against the Red Army.In fact, Chapter 2 will show that in the twentieth century “our nation”won wars most often by belonging to an alliance that was richer andlarger than the adversary’s alliance. This finding does not particularlyhelp to affirm anyone’s national identity, not does it contribute an excitingstory. Nonetheless it fits most of the patterns in the data much better thanany hypothesis based on national exceptions or peculiarities.A lesson is that the student of coercion and conflict needs to approachall good stories equipped with a strong sense of scepticism. A deep
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understanding and continuous awareness of the risks of the Type I erroris an essential element of the economist’s toolkit.
A chapter-by-chapter summaryTable 1 sets out the basic tools used in this book, chapter by chapter. Notevery tool is used in every chapter. Notably, no chapter could have beenwritten without reference to the economist’s idea of rationality.
Table 1. The economist’s toolkit, chapter by chapter Type I errorsSurplus extractionScale and state capacityDiminishing and increasing returnsStrategic interaction; multiple equilibriaRational actors; expected costs and benefits1. War and Disintegration, 1913 to 1945  2. Why the Wealthy Won   3. Why Didn't the Soviet Economy Collapse     4. The Frequency of Wars    5. Soviet Industry and the Red Army Under Stalin   6. Contracting for Quality under a Dictator   7. A Soviet Quasi-Market for Inventions   8. The Political Economy of a Soviet Military R&D Failure   9. The Fundamental Problem of Command    10. Accumulation and Labor Coercion Under Late Stalinism    11. Economic Information in the Life and Death    12. Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse    
The economics of global warThe book is divided into three parts. The first part is devoted to theeconomics of global war. A common theme of the chapters in this part ofthe book is the importance of scale, resources, and state capacity in theoutcomes of wars.In Chapter 1, “War and Disintegration, 1914-1945,” Jari Eloranta and Iexamine Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. Globalizationcame to an abrupt halt, replaced by protectionism, nationalism, war, andkilling and destruction on an immense scale. In mid-century, globalizationwas resumed, and the European economies began to converge on muchhigher and more uniform income levels. After two world wars, threethings had changed. First, European economic growth, integration, andprosperity had lost its association with empire. No doubt to the surpriseof Europe’s nineteenth century leaders, had they lived to see it, it provedpossible to acquire wealth and wield influence without claiming imperialsway over vast stretches of faraway peoples and their lands and oceans.
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Second, Europe’s leaders had a new sense of the importance ofcooperation. They now cooperated with the United States in economicrecovery, exchange rate coordination, and tariff reduction, with eachother in laying new foundations for European integration, and withdeveloping countries in decolonization and development assistance.Third, Europe’s leaders had learned to use the power of the state toregulate economic life. Learning the appropriate limits of governmentcontrol over the market economy in turn became a major challenge of thepostwar period.In Chapter 2, “Why the Wealthy Won,” I look more closely at the rootsof victory and defeat in two world wars. The chapter starts from thevariation that we observe in the degrees of economic mobilization ofdifferent countries for total war in the twentieth century. Most of thisvariation is explained by differences in the level of economic developmentof each country, though not all of it and there some exceptions. There areseveral good reasons that help to explain why mobilization capacityshould depend significantly on economic development. The empiricalrecord is to some extent a puzzle since it seems to leave little room forother factors that would feature prominently in narrative accounts, suchas national differences in war preparations, war leadership, or militaryorganization and morale. The chapter looks at ways of solving this puzzle.Chapter 3 asks “Why Didn’t the Soviet Economy Collapse in 1942?” Itappraises the economic dimensions of World War II both generally andwith specific reference to the eastern front. When the Soviet war effort isexamined more closely, it becomes surprising that the Soviet economy didnot collapse in 1942. A rational-choice model is developed to illustrate theeconomic conditions under which a wartime collapse of the economy isrendered more and less likely. The possible effects of policy interventionsby Stalin, Hitler, and Roosevelt on the stability of the Soviet war effort aredefined.In Chapter 4, “The Frequency of Wars,” Nikolaus Wolf and I step backfrom particular countries and conflicts to the puzzles that arise from aquantitative overview of world history. Conflicts among states are, itseems, increasingly frequent, and the trend has been steadily upwardsince 1870. The main tradition of Western political and philosophicalthought suggests that extensive economic globalization anddemocratization over this period should have reduced appetites for warfar below their current level. This view is clearly incomplete: at best,confounding factors are at work. Here, we explore the capacity to wagewar. Most fundamentally, the growing number of sovereign states hasbeen closely associated with the spread of democracy and increasingcommercial openness, as well as the number of bilateral conflicts. Tradeand democracy are traditionally thought of as goods, both in themselves,
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and because they reduce the willingness to go to war, conditional on thenational capacity to do so. But the same factors may also have beenincreasing the capacity for war, and so its frequency. The chapterconcludes that we need better understanding of how to promote thesegoods without incurring adverse side-effects on world peace.8
Communism and defenceThe middle part of the book focuses on the relationship betweencommunism and defence. In all countries where communists ruled, themechanisms of power were designed on a similar template of coercionand repression. The two best accounts of this template are thesociological findings of Inkeles and Bauer (1959) on the Soviet Union andAnne Applebaum’s (2012) new history of the imposition of communistrule on Eastern Europe.The more we know about communist rule from the inside, the moreimportant it seems to be that we understand how preparations forexternal conflict were linked to coercion at home. A common theme of thechapters in this part of the book is strategic interaction, conflict, andbargaining over the surpluses that the communist rulers were willing toshare with the military and industrial interests that had the job ofsupplying defence needs.Chapter 5, “Soviet Industry and the Red Army Under Stalin,” considerssome views of the Soviet “military-industrial complex” that are current inthe literature. The economic weight of the defence sector in the economicsystem is summarized in various aspects. The lessons of archival researchare used as a basis for analysing the army–industry relationship underStalin as a prisoners’ dilemma in which, despite the potential gains frommutual cooperation, each party faced a strong incentive to cheat on theother. The chapter concludes that the idea of a Soviet military–industrialcomplex is not strictly applicable to the Stalin period, but there may begreater justification for the Soviet Union after Stalin.In Chapter 6, “Contracting for Quality under a Dictator,” AndreiMarkevich and I examine military procurement in the Soviet economyunder Stalin. This provides a novel historical context for a standardproblem of market organization, that of contracting for quality. The Sovietministry of defense was engaged in the procurement of military goodsfrom Soviet industry. An internal market was formed and contracts weremade. In the market, the contractor had power over the buyer and
8 This chapter came under critical fire from leading political scientists.For their criticisms and our replies see Gleditsch and Pickering (2013)and Harrison and Wolf (2013).
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typically used this power to default on quality. In the background loomeda dictator, imperfectly informed, but with the power to tear up anycontract and impose unlimited penalties on the contractor. The buyer’scounter-action took the form of deploying agents through industry withthe authority to verify quality and reject substandard goods. The finalcompromise restored quality at the expense of quantity. Being illicit, ithad to be hidden from the dictator. Our case provides an historicalillustration of the limits of dictatorship.Chapter 7, “A Soviet Quasi-Market for Inventions,” is also about theallocation of resources in the Soviet economy under Stalin’s dictatorship.In this chapter the resources were designated for military research anddevelopment. The context was formed by the rapidly approaching limitsof an existing aviation propulsion technology, the need to replace it withanother, and profound uncertainty as to how to do so. In the process weobserve the formation of a internal “market” in which rival designersproposed projects and competed for funding to carry them out. Weobserve rivalry and rent seeking by agents, imperfectly regulated byprincipals. As rent seeking spread and uncertainty was reduced, thechapter shows, the market was closed down and replaced by stricthierarchical allocation and monitoring.Chapter 8 examines “The Political Economy of a Soviet R&D Failure,”the prewar attempt to create a new aeroengine technology based on thesteam turbine. From this example we find out more about themotivations, strategies, and payoffs of principals and agents in the Sovietcommand economy. Alternative approaches to the evaluation of R&Dfailure are outlined. New archival documentation shows the scale andscope of the Soviet R&D effort in this field. The allocation of R&Dresources resulted from agents’ horizontal interactions within a verticalcommand hierarchy. Project funding was determined in a context ofbiased information, adverse selection, and agents’ rent seeking. Fundingwas rationed across projects and through time. Budget constraints onindividual projects were softened in the presence of sunk costs, but werehardened periodically. There is no evidence that rents were intentionallydistributed through the Soviet military R&D system to win trust orreward loyalty; the termination of aviation steam power R&D in 1939despite the sunk costs they represented was timely.
Communism and coercionCommunist rule rested ultimately on command and coercion, and thethird part of the book focuses directly on this. Again, there is a lot aboutstrategic interaction between the state and the citizens, this timeconceptualized more broadly as producers and even consumers.
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Chapter 9, “The Fundamental Problem of Command,” studies theproblems that arose under communist rule when the dictator gave anorder to an agent and advanced resources for its implementation. Thetemptation was for the agent to shirk or steal from the principal ratherthan comply; this constitutes the fundamental problem of command.Historically, partially centralized command economies enforcedcompliance in various ways, assisted by nesting the fundamental problemof exchange within that of command. The Soviet economy provides somerelevant data. The Soviet command system combined severalenforcement mechanisms in an equilibrium that shifted as agents learnedand each mechanism’s comparative costs and benefits changed. When theconditions for an equilibrium disappeared, the system collapsed. Anextractive state had the task of aligning the incentives of its citizens towork together for the surplus that the state required to finance its owngoals. The citizens faced continual temptations to shirk and steal. Keepingeverything together was at least a feasible problem in the age of massproduction of things. With the information revolution and the rise of theservices economy this task became more and more complex andultimately, perhaps, infeasible.In Chapter 10, “Accumulation and Labour Coercion,” Paul Gregory andI examine how the level of coercion affected Soviet wages and the surplusavailable for investment under Stalin. From 1940 until the death of Stalinthe conditions of Soviet labour were highly regimented under draconianlegislation which prescribed imprisonment and forced labour for evenminor violations. How successful was this experience? A successful use ofcoercion implied that fewer resources would be needed for consumption,without compromising the amount of effort supplied by the workers. Inthe desired outcome, accumulation would be enabled to grow. A majorissue was the problem of mistakes and unintended consequences ofvarious kinds. In the face of harsh punitive measures Soviet workersshifted effort from production to mutual insurance through informalhorizontal and vertical networks. The Stalinist leaders often interpretedattempts to protect subordinates as proof of conscious or unconsciousbetrayal of the party and Stalin, which then became an occasion for newrepression. In this atmosphere, the likelihood of errors in the allocation ofboth labour and capital was only increased. In such conditions it ispossible coercion did not contribute to an increase in the level ofaccumulation. In fact, it is quite likely that the Soviet economy’saccumulation capacity improved after Stalin died and his successorsreduced the level of violence in the economy.Chapter 11, “Economic Information in the Life and Death of the SovietCommand System,” shifts the focus to information problems undercommunism. In market economies information adds value to transactions
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in three ways: it supports reputations, permits customisation, andprovides yardsticks. In the Soviet economy such information wasfrequently not produced; if produced, it was often concealed; whetherconcealed or not, it was often of poor quality; regardless of quality, itoften suffered from low credibility outside the ruling circle. In short, theSoviet command system forced economic growth on the basis of arelatively low–value information stock. This might help explain aspects ofSoviet postwar economic growth and slowdown, the collapse of thecommand system, and the persistence of low output after the collapse.Chapter 12, “Coercion, Compliance, and the Collapse of the SovietCommand Economy,” concludes the book. It addresses directly theproblem of how and why the Soviet economy collapsed in 1991. It beginsby asking whether command systems that rest on coercion are inherentlyunstable, and whether the Soviet economy collapsed for this reason. Theproblem is that, until it collapsed, the Soviet economy did not lookunstable. Why did it then collapse? A game between a dictator and aproducer shows that a high level of coercion may yield a stable high–output equilibrium, that stability may rest in part on the dictator’sreputation, and that a collapse may be brought about by adverse trends inthe dictator’s regime costs and a loss of reputation. The facts of the Sovietcase are consistent with a collapse that was triggered by the Russianworkers’ strike movement of 1989.
ConclusionIn this book I apply the concepts and methods of analysis that I havefound most useful for study of the economics of coercion and conflict. Theeconomist’s toolkit is versatile, and can be applied to many problems thatare not economic at first sight. Each of the tools is useful provided it isapplied to the right context. The problem is to recognize the context andselect the right tool. If you want to fix together two pieces of wood, thereare times when nails will do the job and sometimes it requires screws.Hammering a screw and trying to turn a nail will get you nowhere.Sometimes the economist’s toolkit must fall short. Is economicsadequate by itself for a rounded understanding of everything that iswrapped up in the subject of coercion and conflict? Clearly not. Power isabout politics before it is about economics. War is a political act. Forceand violence are the most multidisciplinary of human activities. Theyengage our emotions as well as our reason. In my own work, whether Ihave acknowledged it or not, I am sure that I have also borrowed manyideas drawn from psychology, political and strategic studies, internationalrelations, and historical narrative. Nonetheless, any activity that involves
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the expenditure of effort for an expected return has an economicdimension, and that is the justification of the present book.
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